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Background: In many parts of the world, livestock production is undergoing a process of rapid 
intensification. The health implications of this development are uncertain. Intensification creates 
cheaper products, allowing more people to access animal-based foods. However, some practices asso-
ciated with intensification may contribute to zoonotic disease emergence and spread: for example, 
the sustained use of antibiotics, concentration of animals in confined units, and long distances and 
frequent movement of livestock.
oBjectives: Here we present the diverse range of ecological, biological, and socioeconomic factors 
likely to enhance or reduce zoonotic risk, and identify ways in which a comprehensive risk analysis 
may be conducted by using an interdisciplinary approach. We also offer a conceptual framework to 
guide systematic research on this problem.
discussion: We recommend that interdisciplinary work on zoonotic risk should take into account 
the complexity of risk environments, rather than limiting studies to simple linear causal relations 
between risk drivers and disease emergence and/or spread. In addition, interdisciplinary integration 
is needed at different levels of analysis, from the study of risk environments to the identification of 
policy options for risk management.
conclusion: Given rapid changes in livestock production systems and their potential health 
implications at the local and global level, the problem we analyze here is of great importance for 
environmental health and development. Although we offer a systematic inter disciplinary approach 
to understand and address these implications, we recog nize that further research is needed to clarify 
methodological and practical questions arising from the integration of the natural and social sciences.
key words: emerging diseases, integrated ecology and human health, livestock production, risk 
characterization, risk management, zoonoses.
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Introduction
Recent studies indicate that more than three-
fourths of communicable human diseases are 
zoonotic in origin (Woolhouse and Gowtage-
Sequeria 2005), including diseases associated 
with significant mortality and morbidity such 
as avian influenza (H5N1), severe acute respi-
ratory syndrome (SARS), Ebola virus, and 
Nipah virus. Some of these zoonotic diseases 
originate in wildlife and others in domestic 
livestock species; many have the potential to 
affect humans through a livestock–human 
interface (Cleaveland et al. 2001) in which 
domestic livestock can act as “amplifier hosts” 
(Keesing et al. 2010) for diseases that they con-
tract from wildlife and then pass to humans 
through frequent and close contact. In light 
of this, there is growing interest in promot-
ing cooperation between medical and veteri-
nary sectors, as captured in the concept of 
“one health” (Zinsstag et al. 2011). Scientific 
research is now focusing on the inter actions 
between humans, domestic animals, and wild 
animals to better understand the mechanisms 
of disease emergence and transmission, thus 
informing more effective policies for commu-
nicable disease prevention and control.
In this context, current trends in live-
stock production have received growing 
attention (Coker et al. 2011). Although 
production in Europe and North America 
has gradually stabilized, in low- and middle-
income countries (LIMCs) production is 
becoming more diverse, with continuing 
small-scale production—often on farms 
closely associated with natural habitats 
and wildlife—as well as highly intensified, 
industrial-style production units, often in 
peri-urban settings (Thornton 2010).
It has long been argued that this “livestock 
revolution” (Delgado et al. 1999) could pose 
new threats to public health and the environ-
ment (Leibler et al. 2009; World Bank 2009). 
Given our understanding of the links between 
livestock species and emerging zoonoses, it is 
relevant to ask whether changes in produc-
tion systems might increase or decrease the risk 
of disease emergence in human populations. 
What husbandry practices are most likely to 
facilitate or prevent the emergence of new 
pathogens and their transmission to humans? 
What can be done to reduce risks? What bal-
ance is to be struck between these risks and 
the health gains from improved nutrition and 
the economic gains associated with livestock 
intensification? In this commentary, we pro-
vide a brief overview of the diverse range of 
factors likely to influence zoonotic disease risk, 
and identify ways in which a comprehensive 
risk analysis may be conducted by using an 
inter disciplinary approach. We also present 
a conceptual framework for inter disciplinary 
research on this problem, from the identifica-
tion and analysis of risk drivers to the develop-
ment of policy options for risk manage ment.
Intensification and Risk: 
Ecological and Biological 
Features
The ecological and biological processes link-
ing livestock production and zoonotic dis-
eases have developed over thousands of years. 
Domestication of wild animals brought them 
into close contact with human populations, 
which themselves were growing more dense as 
agriculture permitted local population growth, 
resulting in greater opportunities for transmis-
sion and persistence of diseases across humans 
and domestic and wild animals (Diamond 
2002; Wolfe et al. 2007). With subsequent 
industrialization and urbani za tion, consumer 
populations became separated from livestock 
production, leading to increasingly long sup-
ply chains for delivery of animal products and 
creating new and diverse interactions between 
humans, livestock, and livestock products.
Over time, growth in demand and pro-
duction has extended grazing and farm-
ing into natural eco systems, illustrated by 
the recent transformation of portions of the 
Amazon forest into grassland for beef pro-
duction (Fearnside 2005). In many regions, 
however, expansion of extensive production 
has approached its limits because of land 
degradation and lack of available rangelands 
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(Bruinsma 2003). In attempting to meet 
demand, livestock production has evolved and 
diversified, with a global trend toward intensi-
fication. This trend is charac terized by concen-
tration of large numbers of animals in housing 
units, use of concentrate feed, reduced genetic 
diversity, vertical integration, and industrial 
management practices. This “landless” mode of 
production emerged in the United Kingdom 
and the United States in the 1930s (Woods 
2012) and is now increasingly common in 
many LMICs, where it is associated with large 
capital investment, particularly for poultry 
and pig production (Goss and Burch 2001). 
While “backyard” and semi-intensive produc-
tion systems are still widespread, particularly in 
LMICs, industrial enterprises have been esti-
mated to account for 74% of the world’s poul-
try production, 40% of pork, and 68% of egg 
production (Bruinsma 2003).
The health implications of these develop-
ments are uncertain. Large-scale intensive 
units may be good at biosecurity because 
they are usually more isolated from the exter-
nal environment and better protected from 
infection through sustained veterinary control 
and manage ment procedures. On the other 
hand, large numbers of susceptible animals 
in confined spaces increase the risk of disease 
transmission (Graham et al. 2008; Leibler et al. 
2009) and may encourage evolution of patho-
gens (Mennerat et al. 2010). In Thailand, for 
example, broiler houses with advanced ventila-
tion systems allow confinement of up to 1 mil-
lion birds per farm (NaRanong 2008). In such 
conditions, pathogens are likely to have higher 
chances of survival, transmission, and rapid 
evolution (Otte et al. 2007). This can pose 
serious challenges for biosecurity because com-
plete isolation is unlikely. Pathogens may enter 
through ventilation units, feed and water sys-
tems, or livestock and leave through ventila-
tion, animal products, and production waste 
(Leibler et al. 2009). Industrial units can pro-
duce up to two tons of animal waste every day, 
which may contain large quantities of patho-
gens (Hutchison et al. 2005). Much of this 
waste is often held in large, exposed lagoons, 
posing an infection risk for wild mammals and 
birds (Otte et al. 2007). 
Other technical innovations associated 
with intensification have complex risk pro-
files. Although the widespread use of anti-
biotics to prevent infection in intensified 
production may reduce zoonotic risks, non-
therapeutic antibiotic use in animal feeds has 
been shown to serve as a source of anti biotic 
resistance transferable to human pathogens, 
where it may affect treatable human infec-
tions (Marshall and Levy 2011; Silbergeld et al. 
2008; Smillie et al. 2011). The use of imported 
specialized breeds—characterized by genetic 
selection toward increased productivity—also 
has unclear implications for zoonotic risk. 
Although standardization of specialized breeds 
may be associated with lower pathogen diver-
sity (Guernier et al. 2004) and thus reduced 
risk of new pathogen emergence, it can facili-
tate disease transmission due to homo geneity 
in genetic susceptibility. In addition, imported 
breeds may be more vulnerable to pathogens 
than indigenous breeds, which have unique 
adaptive traits selected by farmers in local 
environ ments over many generations, includ-
ing resilience to local parasites and diseases 
(Shand 1997).
In light of these characteristics of mod-
ern farming, we suggest that zoonotic risks 
may be greatest in landscapes where large-
scale production units are in close proximity 
to traditional, small-scale production and to 
wildlife populations through encroachment 
of agricultural production into recently defor-
ested natural habitats. Contacts between live-
stock varieties and wild animals can lead to 
the introduction of pathogens into intensive 
production units, where the high density of 
susceptible animals can facilitate the estab-
lishment, transmission, and amplification of 
pathogens (Gilbert et al. 2006; Slingenbergh 
et al. 2004). 
These conditions are typical of livestock 
intensification today in many LMICs, and 
are exemplified by outbreaks of Nipah virus 
in Asia. The first human outbreaks of Nipah 
virus, harboured by fruit bats (Pteropus spp.), 
occurred in Malaysia in late 1998, causing 
> 100 human deaths (Epstein et al. 2006). The 
index case for these outbreaks, a 30,000-unit 
intensive pig farm in Malaysia, was established 
in a deforested area with resident fruit bat 
popu lations that frequented fruit trees associ-
ated with the farm. The virus was probably 
passed to the pigs through urine and masti-
cated pellets dropped when the bats fed in 
over hanging trees. Pigs acted as amplifier hosts, 
enabling transmission to humans (Pulliam 
et al. 2012); extensive regional trade of infected 
animals increased human infections. 
Intensification and Risk:  
Political and Economic 
Features 
Ecological and biological drivers of disease 
risk are bidirectionally linked to political and 
economic factors. Glass and McAtee (2006) 
identified a range of factors that, although not 
directly associated with disease emergence, can 
alter social conditions in a way that creates a 
new regime of public health risk. For example, 
public distrust in central government resulting 
from corruption, conflicts, and political insta-
bility may disrupt public health systems and 
disease surveillance. Such distrust can itself 
result from zoonotic disease events, as hap-
pened in the United Kingdom following the 
outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopa-
thy (BSE). The lack of trust in government 
agencies associated with this outbreak is 
considered to have been an important factor 
in the sharp fall in immunizations with the 
measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine, despite 
official declarations of their safety (Raithatha 
et al. 2003). 
In the context of agricultural development, 
the economic conditions in which the intensi-
fication of livestock production is taking place 
can also be an important element in increas-
ing risk. Recent global financial investment 
in food commodities, development of local 
and regional chains of capital, and associated 
changes in national policies affecting the live-
stock sector have coincided with privatization, 
market deregu la tion, and reduced government 
spending and structural reforms (Steinfeld 
et al. 2010). In East and Southeast Asia, 
govern ment subsidies and protective measures 
have been progressively removed, and produc-
ers must compete in an environment increas-
ingly driven by global market forces. In some 
places, lack of support for producers has been 
counter acted by the increase in private stan-
dards and farm assurance schemes. For exam-
ple, the Jilin City government in China and a 
Singaporean company are setting up a food-
production area in a 1,450-km2 “disease-free” 
zone that would contain a pig farm expected 
to eventually process 1 million pigs each year 
(Kolesnikov-Jessop 2010). However, in less-
developed countries, such alternative forms of 
risk regulation may be absent.
What are the effects of these economic 
changes on zoonotic risk? At each transi-
tional stage in the value chain, from farm to 
final market, attempts to increase or main-
tain profit margins may create opportunities 
for risks to develop (Mcleod et al. 2009). As 
new large retail units seek to capture market 
shares, they must offer competitive prices by 
cutting costs. Pressure to survive in a highly 
competitive market with minimal govern-
ment support and lack of adequate regulatory 
over sight may encourage retailers and produc-
ers to engage in risky practices, including dis-
investment in animal health and biosecurity.
Other effects may be less direct. For 
example, attempts to decrease labor costs 
may result in the less-effective exercise of 
local control measures, as low-level work-
ers develop labor- and time-saving practices 
for dealing with management pressure and 
working conditions. Withdrawal of state 
subsidies may also affect smallholders (fam-
ily farmers) who are tied to large agribusi-
ness companies through contract farming 
(Catelo and Costales 2008). Large compa-
nies often provide contractors with technical 
support and veterinary assistance; however, 
some may not source supply from small-
holders if they can find larger producers who 
are able to make the necessary investments 
to operate profitably (Costales et al. 2006). 
Zoonotic risk in the new livestock industries
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Under these circumstances, the burden is on 
the smallholders to make the investments. 
If they do not, they may be taken out of the 
market chain and potentially turn to illegal 
trade. Indeed, illegal movement of animals 
and derived products represents one of the 
most important sources of spread of infec-
tious diseases. One example is the significance 
of illegal trade in poultry between countries 
in Southeast Asia in the continued spread 
of avian influenza H5N1 across that region 
(Pfeiffer et al. 2011). 
Compared with small-scale producers, 
large producers may gain political power 
and influence, thus making governments 
less likely to impose strong regulations that 
affect their interests. For example, Wallace 
(2009) concluded that agribusiness com-
panies in Thailand had a great influence on 
policy makers during the first outbreaks of 
avian influenza, to the extent that industrial 
units accelerated production despite pub-
lic health risks. In the early phases, an ini-
tially slow response by government agencies 
exacerbated the problem, although by most 
accounts Thailand later became an exem-
plar in the region of avian influenza control 
through active surveillance and quick inter-
vention (Safman 2009).
Finally, international trade is another 
element in the political economy of risks 
from livestock production. Global trade in 
livestock and livestock products has substan-
tially increased in recent years because of the 
prolifera tion of free trade agreements, more 
efficient transport and communication sys-
tems, and intensive agriculture (Steinfeld 
et al. 2010). Although this development has 
promoted the adoption of international stan-
dards and regulations—such as the standards 
set by the World Organization for Animal 
Heath—it has also enhanced the opportu-
nities for widespread transmission of viral 
infections and bacterial contaminants in ways 
that are still poorly understood (Hodges and 
Kimball 2005).
From Risk Drivers to 
Risk Management
The brief overview of risk factors that we 
have presented here highlights the multi-
dimensional nature of the links between 
changing livestock production practices and 
the emergence and spread of zoonotic dis-
eases. Given this complexity, understand-
ing the conditions that create zoonotic risk 
requires a research approach that links both 
animal and public health sectors and natural 
and social sciences. Other researchers have 
stressed the need for integration in this area 
(Brownlie et al. 2006; Dry and Leach 2010; 
Parkes et al. 2005; Scoones 2010; Wilcox 
and Kueffer 2008). However, few efforts 
have been made to translate the research 
agenda into novel methods and concepts that 
can sustain and guide empirically informed 
scien tific work (Waltner-Toews et al. 2008; 
Wilcox and Gubler 2005; Wood et al. 2012). 
In contributing to these efforts, we suggest 
that inter disciplinary research on zoonotic risk 
should be able to account for the complexity 
of “risk environments” (Barnett and Blaikie 
1992), rather than simple linear causal rela-
tions between risk drivers and disease emer-
gence and/or spread. From this perspective, 
the key scientific challenges are a) to correctly 
define and understand the risk environment 
as part of a larger system that creates risk; and 
b) to deploy a method that combines insights 
along the full extent of the chain of evidence 
from viral genome sequencing to animal keep-
ing and on to animal market economics and 
the politics of food industry regulation. To 
address such complex inter actions and develop 
effective policy, we need integrated research 
that operates at different levels of analysis, 
from the study of risk environments to the 
development of risk scenarios and identifica-
tion of policy options for risk management. 
These linked levels constitute a conceptual 
model illustrated in Figure 1. 
The first level of analysis involves integra-
tion of disciplinary expertise to provide a rich 
socio biological characterization of risk envi-
ronments. The contribution of social scien tists 
enhances understanding of both the politi-
cal economy and the actual practice of live-
stock production and, above all, the relations 
between these. In studies to date, analysis 
of livestock industries is often limited to an 
aggregate of statistical values, framed within 
broad categories such as “industrial,” “semi-
intensive,” “backyard,” or “mixed farming” 
production systems (Robinson et al. 2011). 
Although such classifications are useful for 
organizing the collection and comparison 
of data for analysis, they inevitably obscure 
the complexity of an economic sector that is 
becoming increasingly differentiated. In turn, 
improved knowledge of the structure and 
practices of livestock production can provide 
a framework for strategic pathogen sampling, 
allowing the linkage of production systems—
with their microbial and genetic profiles—to 
identify vulnerabilities and drivers of pathogen 
diversity and evolution at each stage of the 
production process.
A second level of analysis is needed to 
explore the ways in which such socio biologi cal 
configurations may influence pathogen emer-
gence, evolution, and transmission into human 
populations, including the develop ment of 
plausible risk scenarios. Types of zoonotic 
pathogens range from those that can infect 
humans but do not spread, to pathogens that 
spread easily between humans (Wolfe et al. 
2007); evolutionary or ecological conditions 
that favor emergence of the latter types pose 
the greatest risk. Mathematical modeling can 
provide insights into how ecological and evo-
lutionary processes leading to emergence and 
spread of new zoonotic pathogens are likely to 
Figure 1. A conceptual framework that can guide interdisciplinary research on zoonotic risk in the new 
livestock industries. Each rectangle with a dotted border represents a level of analysis in the research 
program. The first step requires the characterization of risk environments, including an understand­
ing of ecological and biological risk drivers, as well as the wider socio economic contexts that influ­
ence them. The second step entails the production of plausible risk scenarios that explore the ways in 
which risk environments may influence pathogen emergence, evolution, and transmission to human 
population. Finally, the third level of analysis evaluates the health and economic burden for given risk 
scenarios in order to identify policy options for risk management, in collaboration with stakeholders and 
agricultural experts.
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be affected by changes in specific features of 
the risk environment. There is a growing body 
of modeling and empirical research on patho-
gen emergence and evolution, as well as on 
pathogens’ dependence on contact networks 
and routes of transmission (Antia et al. 2003; 
Lloyd-Smith et al. 2009; Read and Keeling 
2003, 2006). Such models must consider 
three key processes, all of which are likely to be 
affected by livestock production systems and 
their interactions: 
•	The initial generation of genetic novelty, 
which may vary between production systems. 
For instance, differences in pathogen diver-
sity and anti biotic use in production systems 
may lead to different levels of genetic recom-
bination (MacLean et al. 2010).
•	Subsequent stepwise adaptation of novel, 
more virulent pathogen types to one or more 
host species (Antia et al. 2003), which will 
be affected by different animal life spans 
and different contact patterns within and 
between host species.
•	Sustained transmission within the new host 
population(s), which will be influenced by 
contact patterns, genetic susceptibility, and 
local population sizes and densities, which 
will affect the chance of local extinctions of 
novel pathogens. 
Recent advances in molecular epidemiology 
can also provide powerful tools for testing 
predictions of how pathogens spread and 
evolve, through the capacity to characterize 
pathogen genomes for similarities and differ-
ences across animal and human populations 
(Parkhill and Wren 2011).
Finally, a third level of analysis is required 
to estimate the health and economic burden 
for given risk scenarios and identify policy 
options for risk management. This complex 
issue also requires integration of disciplinary 
perspectives and diverse empirical material, 
including a) epidemiological models at the 
population level, b) health systems indicators, 
c) inward and outward trade indices, d) infor-
mation on existing health and agricultural 
policy and regulations, e) cultural attitudes 
toward specific interventions, f ) political con-
straints and opportunities, and g) economic 
data on livestock production systems. After 
the epidemiological models have been com-
pleted, macro economic modeling has the 
potential to embed such hetero geneous data 
sets into a comprehensive framework for 
assessments of specific interventions in terms 
of cost benefits and cost effectiveness (Beutels 
et al. 2008). For example, the comput-
able general equili brium (CGE) approach, 
a member of the “whole economy” class of 
economic models, can be used to account for 
differential effects of policy options on catego-
ries of social actors (e.g., consumers, produc-
ers, households, governments) (Smith et al. 
2005). In addition, combined with outputs 
from epidemiological models, the CGE 
approach can accommodate the fact that 
zoonotic disease and associated control initia-
tives will affect the economy and population 
health over time, and that the time profiles 
of costs and benefits will be sensitive to the 
sequence of events and interventions (Smith 
et al. 2009). However, such models must be 
sufficiently flexible and open to account for 
the variety of qualitative insights on cultural 
attitudes and governance constraints, in addi-
tion to quantitative data on macro economic 
trends and health indicators (Smith et al. 
2011). The advice and experience of agricul-
tural experts and other stake holders must also 
be included as an active element of the risk 
management strategy.
Conclusions
Livestock intensification will charac terize 
global development for decades to come as 
countries lift themselves out of poverty. 
There are major potential consequences of 
this change, not only with respect to emerg-
ing zoonotic diseases but also to agricultural 
sustainability, food security, and climate 
change effects (Friel et al. 2009). It is not 
at all clear that intensification will lead to a 
greater frequency of zoonotic disease emer-
gence, although some important risk factors 
are present. What is needed is an approach 
to understanding where and how risk can be 
generated. This requires an inter sectoral and 
inter disciplinary approach and a stepwise pro-
cess leading from improved knowledge and 
specification of risk drivers to policy options 
for risk management. However, integrated 
research like this has particular methodologi-
cal challenges. For instance, the develop-
ment of modeling tools able to account for 
the combination of potential risk factors, as 
well as their health and economic effects, 
requires the translation of a diverse range of 
socio economic, biological, cultural, and epi-
demiological information into a common lan-
guage for data collation, comparability, and 
analysis. This process is likely to be difficult 
because different disciplines may rely on dif-
ferent bases for causal inference, notions of 
impact, measurement systems, and theoreti-
cal frameworks. Thus, continued disciplinary 
inter actions, mediated by boundary-spanning 
concepts such as risk environment, are cru-
cial to refine research questions and methods 
toward a common goal. Fruitful relation ships 
of this sort have led to novel insights on the 
dynamics of epidemics—for example, the role 
of concurrent sexual relationships in the con-
text of HIV transmission (Morris et al. 2009). 
Broad inter disciplinary approaches are 
needed to better understand the complex inter-
actions of factors that act together to increase 
or reduce risks to animal and human health 
in the new livestock industries. However, 
such a research program demands solutions to 
theoreti cal and practical issues that are rarely 
addressed in policy statements on “one health.” 
These issues are likely to gain more relevance 
as the focus moves from the domain of pol-
icy making to the research needed to inform 
policy. Thus, these issues should become more 
central in future studies of emerging diseases, as 
in other contexts of inter disciplinary  integration 
between the natural and social sciences.
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